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While many observers were shocked if not horrified by the election of Donald 
Trump, many Italians were feeling déjà vu at what they saw happening across the pond. 
The developments in Italian politics in the last two decades have tended to be disregarded 
by pundits, seeing the Italian experience as the product of idiosyncrasies of a rather 
peculiar country. However, time has shown that Italian flaws were not particularly 
idiosyncratic, as liberal democracy has come to face severe challenges in many Western 
countries. A trip through the past two decades of Italian political history could thus be 
most revealing as to what we may expect in other democracies that are today under 
stress. 
During this period Italy experienced two major anti-élite uprisings. In both the 
1994 and 2013 elections more people changed their vote than at any time in Italian 
history. These two electoral earthquakes resulted from a deep and widespread popular 
dissatisfaction with the political system and mainstream political actors. Both elections 
saw the sudden success of new political parties which transformed Italian politics. In 1994 
the newly established Forza Italia, the party of the tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, won 21 per 
cent of the votes; in 2013 a quarter of Italian voters chose the Five Star Movement led 
by the former comedian Beppe Grillo, a record gain in Italian politics. 
In 1994 the massive electoral realignment occurred in the wake of corruption 
scandals that ended up effectively destroying the party system of what is commonly 
called the ‘First Republic’ (1948-1993). That system amounted to the continuous 
domination of the same governing coalition. In 1992, spectacular revelations started to 
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emerge from investigations into almost every party represented in the Parliament. That 
was the straw that broke the camel’s back, and fueled major structural changes in the 
party system. The result was the almost complete disappearance of most pre-1992 parties 
and their replacement by new political actors who were fundamentally different from 
their precursors in both identity and organization. 
Among the new parties, Forza Italia deserves special attention, as Silvio 
Berlusconi quickly became the indispensable focus of Italian politics. The party system 
of the ‘Second Republic’ was unavoidably marked by a sharp and lasting conflict around 
the figure of the Cavaliere, as he is known and likes to be known. Although there is truth 
in the explanation of his enduring success being based on his control on the media and 
his effective use of political marketing, there is more to it. No one can have such a lasting 
impact on the political life of a country without a political message that corresponds to 
what voters want.  
At its core, Berlusconi’s ideology was a mix of populism and liberalism. He 
rejected the shared, traditional portrayal by Italian political elites of a backward country 
that had to be modernized: the Italian people were good as they were, with their vices 
and their virtues. Berlusconism built on the profound anti-communism of the ‘First 
Republic,’ putting an end to the cultural marginalization of the right in the era pre-1994. 
Although Forza Italia initially brought to Italy the neo-con ideology that had spread in 
the West in the 1980s, its leader gradually dismissed the economic liberalism of the early 
stages, and moved the party to a more traditional conservative stance. The broad appeal 
of this recipe allowed Berlusconi to govern the country for more than ten years between 
1994 and 2011. 
In June 2011, the Economist published a 14-page special report on Italy. The 
cover of the issue featured a picture of a proud Silvio Berlusconi with the title ‘The man 
who screwed an entire country.’ The report had a significant impact on public debate in 
Italy, as it was only in spring 2011 that Berlusconi had started to recognize publicly the 
dire situation of the Italian economy. A few months later, his inadequacy in dealing with 
the economic crisis led to pressures from the EU and international markets for 
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government change. The president of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, demanded 
Berlusconi’s resignation, and asked the former EU-commissioner Mario Monti to form a 
cabinet of technocrats who would deal with the country’s economic and financial 
emergency. With almost no opposition, or indeed serious discussion, in its first months 
of office the Monti Government pushed through two policy packages containing austerity 
and liberalization measures.  
During 2012 the increasing unpopularity of the policies of the technocratic 
government increasingly undermined support from both the mainstream left (the 
Democratic Party) and the mainstream right (the People of Freedom, heir of Forza 
Italia). The credibility of the latter was largely undermined by the failures of the 
Berlusconi government. The right-wing electorate was unhappy with the increases in 
taxation and the pension reform introduced by the Monti government. The left faced the 
dilemmas typical of social-democratic parties in the post-industrial world, in particular, 
its pro-EU stance contrasting with its traditional position on worker protection. 
Moreover, in accepting the appointment of a technocratic executive rather than calling 
for new elections, the left made itself vulnerable to the accusation of weakness. In other 
words, neither the right nor the left seemed willing to take over the responsibility of 
solving the country’s pressing economic and financial problems. These crisis years not 
only put into question the Italian mainstream parties’ capacity to govern by the 
appointment of a technocratic executive; they led many to question the moral integrity 
of the Italian political elite. A large and growing number of journalistic publications 
raised these issues, and this, in turn, gave rise to popular indignation. It is only in this 
context that the astonishing success of the Five Star Movement can be understood.  
The party founded by Beppe Grillo had its roots in the humus of the movements 
of the libertarian left. The five stars of the name represent the main pillars of its founding 
program: defence of the environment, public water service provision, zero-waste 
development, free Internet connectivity, and sustainable transportation. Along with these 
pillars is the emphasis on morality in public life, a central theme of Beppe Grillo’s blog 
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since 2005. The “Clean Up Parliament” initiative and, later, the 2007 “V-Day” rallies 
(literally translatable as “Fuck-off Day”) are manifestations of this reality.  
 While these early experiences can be fit into the various expressions of anti-
Berlusconi mobilisation promoted by left-wing, grassroots activists that emerged in 2001, 
over time Grillo’s relationship to the parties of the left evolved from collaboration to 
competition. Now dominant is an anti-elitist discourse, which refuses to distinguish 
between the left and the right, instead drawing a clear-cut line between the morality of 
ordinary people and the corruption of the elites - so much so that today no concept 
captures the essence of this party better than that of populism. Its populism can be 
categorized as pure, based on its approach to the Internet. For the Five-Star Movement, 
the Web is more than a means of communications and organization, it is a key element 
in its conception of politics and democracy. The exaltation of direct democracy, in its 
digital version, is the concrete expression of its conception of politicians as delegates 
constrained by an ‘imperative mandate’ from the people. However, the leader often 
disavows its democratic principles in practice, imposing a three-line whip upon his MPs 
on controversial policy issues or intervening in the candidate selection process. 
Yet, the populism of the Five Star Movement has not been the sole challenge to 
Italian liberal democracy. The weakening position of Silvio Berlusconi, whose party still 
won more the a fifth of the votes in 2013, has, since then, favoured another party: the 
Northern League. Led by a newly elected leader, Matteo Salvini, the party’s poll ratings 
are currently around 13 per cent nationally, despite having long been active only in the 
Northern part of the country. 
The political and electoral history of the Northern League, the oldest party 
currently represented in the Italian Parliament, has known ups and downs, from the 
semi-clandestine early stages marked by ethnic regionalism to the national prominence 
of the controversial figure of Umberto Bossi, whose shifting personal popularity has been 
reflected in the party’s wavering support. It has always been hard to place the Northern 
League in any party family. The regional nature of the party has undergone significant 
changes during the phases of government and opposition, but what remains consistent 
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for both the grassroots and in its election campaigns is the stress on regional identity, of 
the periphery versus the centre.  
Nevertheless, in every other way, populism for the Northern League is like a 
second skin, in its aversion to politicians and intellectuals, its desire to return to 
community traditions, to look to charismatic personalities, to common sense, to the 
language “spoken by the people”. Although observers have been reluctant to include the 
Northern League in the radical right party family, the features placing it there became 
increasingly obvious over time, especially in its position on immigration, security and 
public order, and, after Italy entered the Eurozone, hostility to the EU. Like other such 
parties the Northern League has been the target of Putin’s influence. Although the party 
has contacts with Russia since the 1990s, under the new leadership of Matteo Salvini it 
has signed an official agreement of collaboration with United Russia, Putin’s party. The 
economic impact EU-imposed Russian sanctions have had on some Northern firms can 
be in part an explanation of this strategy. However, Salvini’s role as mouthpiece of 
Russian propaganda suggests there is something more, something scarier, in that 
agreement. Furthermore, the party platform has recently shifted in an attempt to extend 
its political activity to the rest of the peninsula, a strategy that, even if unlikely to 
succeed, has enabled its leader to present himself as leader of a national alternative to 
the center-left government of Matteo Renzi.  
Appointed Prime Minister in February 2014, the young and ambitious leader of 
the Democratic Party’ honeymoon with Italian voters became rocky when his labour 
market reform alienated many former leftist supporters, and came to an end in late 
2016 with the rejection by referendum of a constitutional reform he had strongly 
advocated. The reform would have overcome the bicameral arrangement of the Italian 
parliamentary system by reducing the Senate’s powers both over the formation of 
governments and in the legislative process. However, the outcome of the referendum was 
mainly driven by widespread dissatisfaction with the government, especially in Southern 
Italy, where the economy has not yet recovered from the crisis. Following Renzi’s 
resignation, the Foreign Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, became prime minister, leaving 
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the composition of the cabinet almost unaffected, and leaving Renzi with significant 
influence over government decisions. After his likely easy win over his internal rivals in 
the upcoming primary elections, he plans to present himself as a fresh candidate in the 
next general election, slated for 2018. As we can see in figure 1, the outcome is less than 
certain. 
In this context, as we can see in the chart, the two challengers described above 
have consolidated their position in the party system and gained further popularity. It is 
hard to tell in which direction they will push Italian politics as it is still unclear under 
which electoral law Italian voters will make their choices next year.  The current 
proportional system – which resulted from a decision by the Constitutional Court which 
abolished the majoritarian bonus provided for by the previous law – has started to display 
its first effects in the increasing fragmentation of the party system. 
 On the left, the Democratic Party has recently suffered a split from two 
influential party leaders to form a new party in addition to the four or five already 
existing. However, they might eventually end up merging in a single list for the next 
election if they manage to overcome the traditional divisiveness of the Italian left. On 
the right, the rise of the Northern League has challenged the central role of Forza Italia 
as coalition builder. The radical right positions of Matteo Salvini seem irreconcilable with 
the moderate stances of the centrist parties once allied with Berlusconi. Furthermore, the 
uncertain future of Forza Italia is still tied to the destiny of its 80-year-old leader. 
The current challenge to liberal-democracy is, in the end, a challenge to 
mainstream politics and, in many respects, a reaction to the failures of established parties. 
The domestic consequences of globalization – in terms of economic competition, 
supranational integration and cultural diversity – have given rise to new political conflicts 
which, in turn, have uprooted the traditional reference points of ‘left’ and ‘right’. The 
failure of mainstream parties to give voice to these new grievances and to propose and 
deliver practical solutions to these challenges have fuelled a vehement popular reaction. 
The economic crisis, thus, has only intensified a deeper political crisis which has been a 
long time coming. 
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Seen from outside, the Italian experience is certainly not encouraging. Italy has 
shown that democracies do not often learn from their mistakes. The politics of 
overpromising nourishes easy hopes and triggers strong disappointments. Populism can 
end up feeding more populism. If Italy manages to muddle through again, this time it 
must figure out a way to break out of this trap. The prospects are rather bleak. 
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Table 1. Election results in 2013 
 Votes (%) Seats (%) 
Left-wing coalition   
   Democratic Party (PD) 25.5 47.1 
   Left Ecology and Freedom (SEL) 3.2 5.9 
   Democratic Center (CD) 0.5 1.0 
Right-wing coalition   
   People of Freedom (PdL)* 21.4 15.6 
   Northern League (LN) 4.0 2.9 
   Brothers of Italy (FdI) 1.9 1.4 
Centrist coalition   
   Civic Choice (SC) 8.6 6.2 
   Center Union (UdC) 1.7 1.3 
Challenger    
   Five Star Movement (M5S) 25.1 17.3 
Note: The table reports the vote and seat share for the Chamber of Deputies. Only parties that obtained 
at least one percent of the seats are included. Source: www.politicaldatayearbook.com. 
* Now again Forza Italia, after the split of a centrist faction who entered the governing coalition. 
 
 
Figure 1. Opinion polling of main Italian parties since the last election 
 
Note: The figure shows monthly averages.  
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